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This article aims to maximize the reliability of presidential power scores for a larger 
number of countries and time periods than currently exists for any single measure 
and in a way that is replicable and easy to update. We begin by identifying all of the 
studies that have estimated the effect of a presidential power variable, clarifying 
what scholars have attempted to capture when they have operationalized the 
concept of presidential power. We then identify all of the measures of presidential 
power that have been proposed over the years, noting the problems that are 
associated with them. To generate our new set of presidential power scores, we 
draw upon the comparative and local knowledge embedded in existing measures of 
presidential power. Employing principal component analysis together with the 
expectation maximization algorithm and maximum likelihood estimation, we 
generate a set of presidential power scores for a larger set of countries and country 
time periods than currently exists, reporting 95 per cent confidence intervals and 
standard errors for the scores. Finally, we discuss the implications of the new set of 
scores for future studies of presidential power. 
 
Estimating the effect of presidential power 
 
There is now a large body of work that has estimated the outcome of variation in 
presidential power. To identify studies of presidential power systematically, we 
searched a selection of leading comparative politics journals. Using the term 
‘presidential power variable’, we searched the American Journal of Political Science, 
American Political Science Review, British Journal of Political Science, Comparative 
Political Studies, Comparative Politics, European Journal of Political Research, 
International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Politics, Political Research Quarterly, and 
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World Politics. All articles published to the end of 2011 that included an estimation 
with a presidential power variable were recorded. These articles were also consulted 
to identify whether or not they referred to other books or journal articles that might 
include such an estimation. In total, 49 studies that included an estimation of 
presidential power were identified.1 The distribution of this work confirms that 
scholars are increasingly choosing to estimate the effect of presidential power 
generally. Four were published from 1995-1999 inclusive and 10 from 2000-2004 
inclusive, whereas 25 articles were published from 2005-2009 inclusive with 10 in 
2010 and 2011 alone. In all but four of these studies presidential power was 
operationalized explicitly or implicitly as an explanatory variable. In these 45 
studies, the dependent variable ranged widely across topics such as economic 
reform; democratic consolidation; the level of protectionism; the effective number of 
parties; cabinet composition; voter turnout; and many others. In 30 of these 45 
studies, variation in presidential power was confirmed to have a significant effect on 
the outcome under investigation. 
What are scholars trying to capture when they estimate the effect of 
presidential power? In 11 of the 49 studies we identified, scholars focused on only a 
specific aspect of presidential power. For example, Cheibub wished to explain 
variation in budget balances in democratic systems.2 Consistent with his focus, he 
operationalized a presidential power variable, but only in terms of the president’s 
power over budgetary policy and the president’s veto power rather than 
presidential power generally. Thus, when scholars wish to test a particular theory of 
                                                
1 A full list of these studies is available in the online material. 
2 Cheibub 2006 
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presidential power, there is evidence that they have estimated the effects of only the 
specific elements of presidential power relating to that theory. 
In the remaining cases, though, scholars stated that they wished to estimate 
the effect of presidential power generally. A very small number of scholars were 
more precise about what they understood by this term. For example, Biglaiser and 
DeRouen stated that they were trying to capture “centralized executive authority”.3 
Hicken and Stoll understood presidential power to be “the degree to which power is 
concentrated in the presidency within the national level of government”.4 Most 
scholars, though, stated only that they were interested in the effects of a general 
term such as presidential power or powers, presidential strength, presidential 
authority, executive power, executive authority, or an equivalent term. While there 
could be semantic differences between these terms, there is no discussion of such 
differences. Scholars have been using them synonymously. With regard to the terms 
presidential power and executive power, there were studies that used the terms 
presidential power and executive power as direct synonyms.5 However, there were 
studies that estimated the effect of variation in the level of constraints on the 
executive in the system of checks and balances. They operationalized Polity’s 
XCONST variable or Henisz’s POLCON variable.6 There were also studies where 
                                                
3 Biglaiser and DeRouen 2004, 567 
4 Hicken and Stoll 2008, 1110 
5 Roper 2002, 253; Clark and Wittrock 2005, 475 and 479 
6 Polity's XCONST variable is available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm with data 
through to 2011 inclusive. Henisz's POLCON variable is available at: http://www-
management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/ with data now through to 2012 (polconiii variable). Both 
accessed 25 April 2013. We excluded studies that estimated the effect of constraints on the executive 
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scholars estimated both a presidential power variable and the XCONST executive 
constraints variable separately.7 In short, scholars were able to distinguish 
presidential power from executive constraints more broadly. We excluded studies 
that estimated solely the effect of executive constraints. 
Overall, we identified 38 studies where scholars tried to estimate the impact 
of presidential power generally. They used different terms to refer to this 
phenomenon, but we can be confident that whatever term they used they were 
trying to capture the extent to which the presidency was a powerful actor within the 
national government, rather than either some specific power of the institution or the 
position of the executive within the system of checks and balances more broadly. 
 
Existing measures of presidential power 
 
How have scholars tried to estimate the impact of presidential power generally? A 
number of the 38 studies we identified drew up a discrete measure of presidential 
power with cross-national country scores. Most studies, though, relied on a measure 
that had been drawn up by other scholars whose sole aim was to generate a set of 
presidential power scores rather than to estimate the empirical effect of variation in 
the scores. These measures were often available only either in specialist journals or 
in online datasets. Therefore, to identify the full set of presidential power measures 
that have been proposed over the years, it was necessary to move beyond a search 
of leading journals. To that end, a separate Google Scholar search was conducted 
                                                                                                                                                 
from the start. So, they are not included in the set of 49 studies of presidential power that we 
identified. 
7 For example, Doyle 2010 
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using terms such as ‘presidential power measure’ and ‘index of presidential power’. 
We identified 19 separate and original measures of presidential power,8 plus a 
further 16 studies that used one of these measures but both/either reported scores 
for a different set of countries and/or gave countries different scores from the 
original study.9 Thus, we have a dataset of 35 measures of presidential power. 
The methodology used across the 35 measures is relatively consistent. The 
measures are all based on a set of individual indicators of presidential power. Often, 
the indicators are binary. If a president enjoys a particular power, then a value of 1 
is assigned for that indicator. Otherwise, a value of 0 is recorded. Sometimes the 
indicators are ordinal. For example, Shugart and Carey propose ten indicators of 
presidential power with each indicator having a range of 0-4.10 Presidents are then 
awarded a score within this range for each indicator. Whether the indicator scores 
are binary or ordinal, the total score for presidential power is invariably the 
aggregate of the scores for each indicator. This generates a set of cross-national 
presidential power scores for particular time periods. 
While there are now many different measures of presidential power, there 
are empirical and theoretical problems with them. First, while none of the measures 
aimed to capture the personal power of individual presidents, the measures did 
capture two different manifestations of presidential power. Some were derived 
solely from constitutional indicators of presidential power, whereas others were 
based on a mix of constitutional and behavioral power, meaning the power of the 
                                                
8 A full list of these studies is available in the online material. 
9 A full list of these studies is available in the online material. 
10 Shugart and Carey 1992 
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presidency in “actual political practice”.11 There are problems with measuring the 
constitutional powers of presidents because constitutions can be imperfect measures 
of actual political power. However, there are also problems with measuring the 
behavioral power of presidents because there is the risk of capturing the impact of 
factors such as party competition, rather than the power of the presidency itself. 
Second, even if we confine ourselves to measures of one type of presidential 
power, the correlation between the different measures can be relatively low. For 
example, comparing only those measures that are based on indicators of 
constitutional powers, the pairwise correlation between the Shugart and Carey and 
Johannsen measures is -0.19.12 The same figure for the Hellman and Frye measures is 
0.50, even though both are measuring presidential power scores only in Central and 
Eastern European and the former Soviet Union.13 Inevitably, this means that 
empirical results are likely to be sensitive to the particular measure that is used.14  
Third, there is great variation in the country coverage of the different studies 
as well as the time periods that were covered. Only three of the 35 measures covered 
a large number of countries across political regimes generally.15 Some focused on 
only one particular region, such as Latin America, Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union, or Africa. Others selected on the basis of a different analytical 
criterion. For example, Tavits reports the scores for 23 countries but only those with 
                                                
11 Siaroff 2003, 303 
12 Shugart and Carey 1992; Johannsen 2003. These figures are based on the way in which the scores are 
calculated that is described in the next section. 
13 Hellman 1996; Frye 1997 
14 Tavits 2009, 48 
15 Shugart and Carey 1992; Siaroff 2003; Johannsen 2002 
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weak presidencies.16 What is more, scholars have now been proposing presidential 
powers scores for nearly 20 years. However, these scores are not updated after 
publication. Given that constitutions are often amended, reported presidential 
power scores can soon go out of date. This means that countries sometimes cannot 
be reliably included in an estimation even if a presidential power score for that 
country exists. 
Finally, there are problems of construct validity. Fortin has shown that the 
indicators of any given measure of presidential power are not necessarily capturing 
a single latent construct.17 She performed factor analysis on a dataset that pooled 
Shugart and Carey’s presidential power scores with Frye, Hellman and Tucker’s 
scores.18 These scores are based on ten indicators of presidential power, capturing 
two different dimensions, one relating to the president’s executive powers with four 
indicators and another relating to the president’s legislative powers with six 
indicators. However, Fortin found that seven of the ten indicators cluster into a 
single factor with eigenvalues greater than 1 and “with no evidence of separate 
latent constructs for legislative and non-legislative powers”.19 She also pointed out 
that the process of aggregating the scores for the individual indicators is 
problematic. She states: “[a]ggregation produces homogeneity claims, meaning that 
equal scores are substitutable or equivalent”.20 However, she noted that “each score 
can be obtained through broad combinations of different powers, and should thus 
                                                
16 Tavits 2008 
17 Fortin 2013 
18 Shugart and Carey 1992; Hellman and Tucker 2000 
19 Fortin 2013, 97 
20 Fortin 2013,107 
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not be considered homogenous in terms of causal analyses”.21 She goes on to argue 
that for any given measure “not all items hypothesized to capture the concept of 
presidential power seem to matter equally in accounting for composite scores” and 
that “not all potentially relevant items were tested”.22 She concludes that existing 
indices of presidential power have “limited validity”.23 
 
Generating a new set of presidential power scores 
 
We wish to generate a time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) dataset of presidential 
power scores with country years as the units of observation. To do so, we resist the 
temptation to construct a new measure of presidential power from scratch. Fortin’s 
study shows that any measure of presidential power is likely to suffer from a basic 
problem of construct validity.24 From this, she concludes very skeptically, effectively 
questioning whether any measure of presidential power is likely to be valid. We 
agree with her analysis, but draw a different conclusion. Most social science 
concepts, such as voter turnout, social equality, corruption, and so on, suffer from 
equivalent problems of construct validity. For that reason, we prefer to place the 
emphasis on the reliability of the data that underpins the concept we are trying to 
capture. Specifically, we wish to avail of the expert information embedded in 
existing measures, but in a way that generates a more reliable set of cross-national 
presidential power scores. 
                                                
21 Fortin 2013,107 
22 Fortin 2013,108 
23 Fortin 2013,108 
24 Fortin 2013 
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To maximize the reliability of our new set of scores, three elements are 
emphasized. First, we focus solely on measures that record the constitutional power 
of presidents. To be sure, constitutions can be sometimes imperfect indicators of 
presidential power, but the overall reliability of our new set of measures is increased 
by referring solely to information in publicly available documents than by including 
essentially contestable judgments about presidential power in practice. Five of the 
35 measures of presidential power that we identified provided scores for the 
behavioral power of presidents.25 Excluding them leaves 30 measures. For the 
purposes of our methodology, two measures of constitutional presidential power 
that scored only a single country were also excluded, leaving a database of 28 
measures from which to generate our new set of scores. 
Second, we wish to draw upon all of the expert information in these 28 
studies, but we wish to generate new scores in a way that indicates their general 
reliability. This allows researchers to make a decision as to whether to include 
particular countries in any estimation of presidential power. Therefore, standard 
errors and 95 per cent confidence intervals are reported for each of our presidential 
power scores.26 
Third, we wish to maximize the reliability of our scores by accounting for 
systematic variation between the 28 measures of presidential power and so reducing 
                                                
25 See the online materials for a full list. 
26 We calculate the confidence intervals and standard errors on the basis of the original prespow 1 and 
2 scores (i.e. before normalization). They provide a measure of the degree of certainty among the 
constitutive measures. Their primary purpose is to provide researchers with an easy way of 
establishing whether a given country score is capturing a shared understanding of presidential 
power among researchers for that country or whether there are divergent opinions. 
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the impact of any idiosyncratic measures. To do so, principal-component analysis 
(PCA) is employed. If certain measures are found to vary systematically from 
others, then it is possible to adjust for the relative importance of those measures 
when generating our new presidential power scores. 
To begin, we identify the time period covered by the presidential power score 
for all of the different countries in each of the 28 original datasets. There can be more 
than one time period for a given country. For example, there are two time periods 
for Albania, 1991-1997 inclusive and 1998-2012 inclusive. These periods correspond 
to the first post-communist constitution that came into force in 1991 and the new 
constitution that was promulgated in 1998. Eight of our 28 datasets recorded a 
presidential power score for Albania for the 1991-1997 period and three for the later 
period. Overall, there are scores for a total of 116 countries and 181 country time 
periods. There was a maximum of four time periods for a number of countries, 
including Chile and Slovakia, and a maximum of 17 presidential power scores for 
one country time period, namely Romania 1991-2012. The mean number of scores 
per country time period was 2.7, the modal category was one score for 54 country 
time periods, and the median number of scores per country time period was two. 
Therefore, the data is in country time period format. Country scores do not change 
on a yearly basis. They change only when the constitution is amended in a way that 
alters that country’s presidential power score. For example, there are two lines for 
Argentina in the dataset; one for the years 1984-1994 and another for the period 
from 1995 onwards, following the constitutional amendments in August 1994. 
 With information about the time period for each country, the first new 
measure can be calculated (prespow1). Given that presidential power scores are 
calculated differently across many of the different datasets, a set of mean 
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normalized scores is generated. For each of the 28 datasets, each country score was 
normalized on the basis of the following formula: (x minus minimum possible 
value)/(maximum possible value minus minimum possible value). For example, 
Shugart and Carey recorded a score of 17 for Panama 1972-2012 on their scale from 
0-40.27 Therefore, the Shugart and Carey normalized presidential power score for 
Panama was 0.43 in a range from 0-1. A score for Panama was recorded in four of 
the 28 datasets. The average of these four normalized scores was 0.47, generating a 
raw (prespow1) measure. The whole set of country scores was then normalized to 
generate a range from 0-1 to facilitate comparison with our second set of scores 
below. The final normalized (prespow1) score for Panama is 0.45. The full set of raw 
and normalized prespow1 scores with standard errors and 95 per cent confidence 
intervals are reported in Table 2 in the online materials.28 A selection of scores is 
provided in Appendix 1a of this article. 
To calculate our second new measure, principal component analysis (PCA) 
was employed. This method relies on a correlation or covariance matrix. However, 
there are large gaps in our sample. Any individual measure of presidential power 
covers only a specific subset of countries and country years. For example, Shugart 
and Carey may have good coverage of the Americas, but no African countries are 
                                                
27 Shugart and Carey 1992 
28 It is important to note that we calculate the confidence intervals on the basis of the original 
presidential power scores that generate our raw scores and not the final normalized 0-1 prespow 1 
and 2 scores. This has the effect that the confidence intervals we report for a given country do not 
necessarily provide a measure of confidence relative to the prespow scores for any other country. 
Rather, they provide a measure of confidence in the level of concordance among the original set of 
scores for that country. 
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included. Moreover, Shugart and Carey’s scores were reported as of 1992. As a 
result, their data will only partially overlap with Hicken and Stoll, who code 
presidential power not only for the Americas but also for countries in Asia, Africa 
and Eastern Europe and who also have the opportunity to record scores for more 
recent country years.29 Therefore, before we can apply PCA, the issue of missing data 
needs to be addressed. 
We do this by following the method of analyzing incomplete data suggested 
by Truxillo and performing PCA by using maximum likelihood estimation with the 
expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm.30 This approach is an alternative to 
multiple imputation and is particularly suited to PCA, for while principal 
components can be explicitly computed, as Chen notes, we can also derive the 
principal components with an EM approach.31 This allows us to use the EM as a 
means to estimate the data we are missing. In essence, this is an iterative procedure, 
which, without explicitly deriving the sample covariance, enables us to determine 
the subspace spanned by the dominant eigenvector.32 The initial step in this 
approach involves computing the maximum likelihood estimates of the mean vector 
and covariance matrix for our set of 28 presidential power measures.33 These 
estimates are derived from an iterative expectation-maximization algorithm.34 The 
                                                
29 Hicken and Stoll 2008; Shugart and Carey 1992 
30 Truxillo 2005 
31 Chen 2002, 4.  
32 Chen 2002, 5. 
33 Given our data is in country constitution format, the starting point for each country, is the first 
constitution where we have a measure of presidential power.   
34 Truxillo 2005, 3; see the website for the full code.  
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EM algorithm provides estimates of the missing data based on the observed values 
within the dataset, that is, the existing measures of presidential power. In doing so, 
it estimates parameters that take into account any dependencies in the missingness 
among our measures of power.35 So, the Expectation (E) step fills in the gaps in our 
data. The now complete data, including all observed and estimated data points, are 
processed with maximum-likelihood estimation, or the Maximization (M) step. This 
provides the updated mean vector and covariance matrix estimates. This process is 
repeated until the "maximum change in the estimates from one iteration to the next 
does not exceed a convergence criterion".36 That is, with the new data from the M 
step, the E is repeated, followed again by the M step, and so on. This iterative 
process continues until we derive reliable estimates of the missing data matrix.  
With complete data, we can then perform PCA. This method seeks a linear 
combination of potentially correlated variables and extracts the maximum variance 
from them. The resulting principal component (Y1) is weighted by the degree to 
which each original variable explains the variance in the underlying orthogonal 
dimension.37 That is,  
Y1 = a11X1 + a12X2 + ... +a1pXp   
Each of the 28 measures of presidential power can be treated as a separate variable. 
Using PCA, a single presidential power score can be generated for each country 
                                                
35 Truxillo 2005, 3. 
36 Truxillo 2005, 3; for the EM algorithm more generally, see McLachlan and Krishnan 1997. 
37 See for example Flury 1988; Jolliffe 2002. 
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time period using the information from all 28 measures.38 The resulting measure is a 
linear weighted construct of all existing power measures.39 Using this technique, we 
can control for variation across the 28 measures of presidential power, reducing the 
impact of idiosyncratic measures on the final presidential power score that we 
report. This method allows us to weight the contribution of each existing measure of 
presidential power. Thus, the prespow2 scores are a linear construct of all existing 
presidential power variables, which are weighted by their rotated component scores.40 
These scores capture the underlying variance explained by each measure of power. 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is quite high, lending 
credence to our low-dimensional representation of presidential power. In a final 
step, the raw scores are normalized to generate a range from 0-1. The full set of raw 
and normalized prespow2 scores with standard errors and 95 per cent confidence 
                                                
38 We use the command pcamat in Stata 13. This allows the covariance matrix C to be specified as a k x 
k symmetric matrix. We also avoid biased estimates by specifying the column-wise minimum n as 
suggested by Truxillo 2005.  
39 If our data exhibits serial dependence, then this will undermine the assumptions needed to perform 
PCA on longitudinal data (for example, Wansbeek and Meijer 2000). However, our raw data is in 
country time period format, meaning that we do not perform PCA with a long time series, which is 
where we are most likely to find this type of auto-correlation. In fact, the results of a Wooldridge test 
for serial correlation indicates that this is not an issue for our data (see Drukker 2003). Nonetheless, 
as a further robustness test, we also performed a dynamic PCA with panel data. Please see the online 
material for more detail on this analysis. The result of the dynamic PCA model has a correlation with 
prespow2 of over 0.93. 
40 As part of this process, each measure of presidential power is standardized with mean 0 and 
variance 1. 
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intervals are reported in Table 3 in the online materials.41 A selection of scores is 
provided in Appendix 1b of this article. 
 
Discussion 
 
We have generated a set of presidential power scores for a greater number of 
countries and country years than any existing dataset. By accounting for the 
idiosyncrasies of existing measures, we have maximized the reliability of our set of 
scores relative to any existing measure. By using publicly available measures, our 
method is replicable. Our scores also have the potential to be dynamic. Our method 
makes it easy to include new measures of presidential power and generate updated 
prespow1 and prespow2 scores. In fact, additional measures would be welcomed, as 
they will help to further increase the reliability of the scores. To be sure, if scholars 
wish to test a particular theoretical proposition about a certain aspect of presidential 
power, such as veto power or decree power, then they should construct their own 
measure and estimate its effect.42 However, if scholars wish to examine the effect of 
presidential power generally, which has been the purpose of the vast majority of 
                                                
41 It is important to note that we calculate the confidence intervals on the basis of the original 
prespow 1 and 2 scores that generate our raw scores and not the final normalized 0-1 prespow 1 and 
2 scores. This has the effect that the confidence intervals we report for a given country do not 
necessarily provide a measure of confidence relative to the prespow scores for any other country. 
Rather, they provide a measure of confidence in the level of concordance among the original set of 
scores for that country. 
42 Martínez-Gallardo 2012. We would like to thank Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo for drawing our 
attention to this important point. 
 17 
studies to date, there is great benefit to be gained from the scores we have 
generated. With this aim in mind, two points should be emphasized. 
First, for both of our measures standard errors and 95 per cent confidence 
intervals for each country year have been reported. This allows the basic reliability 
of any individual score to be identified, meaning that scholars can make an 
informed choice about whether or not to include a country in their estimation. For 
example, there are only two original scores for Cyprus (1960-) and both are very 
different. The normalized Hicken and Stoll score is 0.325, while for Shugart it is 1.43 
Cyprus is the only presidential system in Europe. Therefore, the relatively high 
scores for Cyprus in the Appendices might be considered to have good face validity 
(prespow1 = 0.64, prespow2 = 0.70). However, the Tables in the Appendix show that 
the confidence intervals for Cyprus are very large, reflecting the differences in the 
original measures. The way that the scores have been generated and reported gives 
scholars the opportunity to decide whether or not to include Cyprus in any 
estimation. Some may wish to include it because of what they might consider to be 
good face validity. Others may wish to exclude it because of the large confidence 
intervals. We make no recommendation, but we provide the grounds on which 
scholars can make an informed choice. 
Second, we also provide the grounds on which scholars can decide which set 
of scores to use in comparative analysis. Figure 1 compares the range of standard 
errors for the prespow1 and prespow2 scores for the different regions. It suggests 
that the prespow2 scores increase the range of the standard errors for Latin 
America, but decrease it for both Africa and Asia. The effect on the scores for 
                                                
43 Hicken and Stoll 2008; Shugart 1996 
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presidents in European countries is minimal. This suggests that scholars wanting to 
estimate the effect of presidential power solely in Latin America might wish to use 
the prespow1 scores. However, scholars wanting to estimate the effect of 
presidential power solely in Africa might wish to use the prespow2 scores. Scholars 
who wanted to estimate the effect of presidential power across all regions might also 
wish to use the prespow2 scores, because on balance the reliability of the whole set 
of scores is probably slightly greater, even if the range of the standard errors in 
Latin America is increased. Again, we make no firm recommendation because the 
choice will be sensitive to the precise case selection with which the scholar is 
working. However, we provide information with which the scholar can make an 
informed decision. 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Conclusion  
 
Studies have increasingly demonstrated that presidential power has an impact on a 
wide range of political outcomes. However, there are many separate measures of 
presidential power. By pooling the comparative and local knowledge present in 28 
existing measures, we have generated a new set of presidential power scores for a 
larger number of countries and a longer time series than before. We have also 
maximized the reliability of these scores by deriving them solely from measures 
based on constitutional indicators of presidential power and by using a method that 
accounts for the idiosyncrasies of country scores in existing measures. In addition, 
by reporting the standard errors and the confidence intervals for all the country 
years in our measures, we have provided information with which scholars can make 
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an informed choice about whether or not a particular country should be included in 
an estimation and which of our measures should be used in comparative studies. 
Overall, we encourage people to keep developing new measures of presidential 
power and to update existing measures for as many countries and as long a time 
period as possible. The advantage of our approach is that new country scores can be 
easily incorporated into the method we have used, creating the potential for country 
coverage to be further extended, for existing country scores to be updated, and for 
cross-national measures to become even more reliable.44 
                                                
44 We will provide updated scores at our website www.presidential-power.com. 
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Figure 1: The Distribution of Standard Errors for prespow1 and prespow2  
 
 
Note: The thick white lines within each box represent the median. The outside edges of the boxes 
represent the 25% quantile and the 75% quantile. The whiskers report outliers. The hollow circles 
represent data points 1.5 times outside of the interquartile range. 
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Appendix 1a Sample of prespow1 scores 
Country Year Raw score Standard errors 
95% Confidence 
Intervals for 
raw scores 
Normalized 
score 
Albania 1991-1998 0.214 0.037 0.127 0.301 0.181 
Albania 1998 - 0.175 0.027 0.055 0.295 0.141 
…         Argentina 1984-1994 0.317 0.032 -0.098 0.732 0.288 
Argentina 1994 - 0.430 0.049 0.294 0.567 0.407 
…      Chile 1891-1925 0.400       0.375 
Chile 1925-1969 0.500       0.479 
Chile 1969-1973 0.542 0.058 -0.191 1.275 0.523 
Chile 1989 - 0.587 0.058 0.427 0.747 0.570 
…         Cyprus 1960 - 0.663 0.338 -3.626 4.951 0.648 
…         Panama 1972 - 0.474 0.046 0.326 0.621 0.452 
      Romania 1992 - 0.280 0.033 0.211 0.349 0.250 
…      Zimbabwe 1991-2008 0.752 0.189 -0.061 1.565 0.742 
 
Appendix 1b Sample of prespow2 scores 
Country Year Raw score Standard errors 
95% Confidence 
Intervals for 
raw scores 
Normalized 
score 
Albania 1991-1998 -0.181 0.038 -0.270 -0.091 0.215 
Albania 1998 - -0.203 0.116 -0.704 0.298 0.185 
…         Argentina 1984-1994 -0.069 0.078 -1.059 0.921 0.363 
Argentina 1994 - 0.052 0.047 -0.078 0.182 0.523 
…      Chile 1891-1925 0.041       0.509 
Chile 1925-1969 0.105       0.593 
Chile 1969-1973 0.143 0.025 -0.169 0.456 0.644 
Chile 1989 - 0.293 0.069 0.102 0.485 0.843 
…         Cyprus 1960 - 0.183 0.184 -2.154 2.520 0.697 
…         Panama 1972 - 0.137 0.033 0.031 0.243 0.636 
      Romania 1992 - 0.006 0.034 -0.067 0.079 0.463 
…      Zimbabwe 1991-2008 0.172 0.044 -0.019 0.362 0.682 
 
 
